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This paper compares participation in different forms of political action between na-
tives, immigrants and non-citizen immigrants using data from thirteen European 
countries across six waves of the European Social Survey. The authors highlight prob-
lems associated with previous categorizations of political action, and find that when 
political action is disaggregated and relative participation between groups is exam-
ined, that immigrants’ patterns of participation are not substantially different from 
those of natives. When comparing citizen immigrants to non-citizen immigrants, 
previous research has suggested that citizenship acts as a “ticket” to non-institutional, 
unconventional, confrontational forms of political action. The authors’ findings in-
stead suggest a more complicated relationship between immigrant/citizenship status 
and preferences for political action since citizenship may facilitate participation in 
both so-called institutional and extra-institutional activities depending on the context 
of action.
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 Introduction
The integration of immigrant groups into European society (which includes a 
growing presence of non-citizen immigrants) continues to be a salient politi-
cal issue in Europe. While citizen and non-citizen immigrants have been pres-
ent in European countries for decades, there was little expectation that they 
would be politically active, particularly in so-called “extra-institutional” forms 
of action, which are often associated with public, more costly (and riskier) dis-
ruptive activities like protest demonstrations (Martiniello 2005). More recent 
evidence suggests that like natives, immigrant citizens and non-citizens do 
participate in a range of political activities from petition signing to protest 
demonstrations (see Klandermans, van Stekelenburg and van der Toorn 2008; 
Just and Anderson 2012; de Rooij 2012; Okamoto and Ebert 2010). However, for 
immigrants (particularly non-citizens) whose legal and social status is more 
fragile, public, disruptive and potentially more confrontational activities like 
protest demonstrations may be both riskier and more costly than they are 
for natives (Klandermans, van Stekelenburg and van der Toorn 2008; Just and 
Anderson 2012). Immigrants, and particularly non-citizens, may therefore be 
wary of participating in these types of action. Research therefore points to sev-
eral questions: are immigrants as politically active as natives? Do immigrants 
who are not citizens participate similarly to those who have citizenship? Do 
patterns of activity across types of political action differ between these groups 
(natives, immigrant citizens, and immigrant non-citizens)? Do differences in 
these patterns suggest that immigrant citizens and non-citizens are wary of 
(or, conversely, drawn to) types of action traditionally labeled as either insti-
tutional (or conventional) or non-institutional actions (or unconventional)?
Recent comparative studies of immigrant political participation in Europe 
(Just and Anderson 2012; de Rooij 2012) concluded that immigrant groups, 
particularly non-citizens, are less inclined to participate overall, and are par-
ticularly less likely to participate in what were framed as higher cost, disrup-
tive forms of action. By and large, these findings were interpreted in terms 
of the lack of social and political resources associated with immigrant and 
non-citizen status, suggesting that this suppresses their levels of participation 
in higher cost or more disruptive forms of action compared to natives. Yet, 
theories of political participation and collective action offer a competing ex-
pectation: that precisely because of their limited access to conventional social 
and political resources, and their marginalization from political institutions, 
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immigrant groups may prefer so-called extra-institutional forms of political 
action, like protest demonstrations. Thus, the literature on immigrant political 
participation provides two plausible and competing theories about action, with 
scholars using one or the other to justify their empirical claims: political out-
siders are either empowered by inclusion to participate in extra-institutional 
activities or, their inclusion increases their participation in institutional forms 
of political action.
We posit that competing claims about how and why immigrant and non-
citizen political participation varies are strongly driven by conceptual and def-
initional ambiguities around political participation. In this paper, we therefore 
avoid a priori classifications of types of political participation (for example 
by cost, institutionality, or disruptiveness). This gives a clearer picture of the 
differences and similarities in participation patterns by immigration status. 
Using this approach, we find that the overwhelming picture is one of similarity. 
Although immigrants, and particularly non-citizens, are overall less likely than 
natives to participate politically, their patterns of participation across different 
types of activity are very similar. Where there are differences, our results sug-
gest that these are not well captured by traditional classifications of political 
activity. When comparing immigrant citizens to non-citizens, our findings sug-
gest that rather than acting as a ticket to participation in unconventional forms 
of action, citizenship may in fact also encourage participation in more conven-
tional or institutional actions. We suggest that there may be other dimensions 
of political action in addition to costs and institutionality that are more useful 
when comparing patterns of political participation between groups.
We begin the paper by situating theories of immigrant political participa-
tion within the broader literature on political and collective action. We out-
line three basic scenarios about absolute and relative levels of participation 
in different forms of action. We then discuss the ways in which political par-
ticipation is conceptualized and categorized particularly in terms of underly-
ing assumptions about the costs of participating in different types of action. 
Before describing our data and methods, we outline concerns about how im-
migrant and non-citizen immigrant political participation is measured and 
how this might shape conclusions about their political involvement. In our 
discussion, we raise questions about the necessity of developing separate the-
oretical frameworks for understanding immigrant political participation, and 
highlight the importance of linking individual and contextual factors thought 
to influence preferences for different types of action.
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 Immigrant Citizen and Non-Citizen Political Participation: 
Theoretical and Empirical Considerations
The literature on immigrant political participation has focused on electoral 
forms of participation (or lack thereof), often ignoring the ways in which 
immigrant citizens and non-citizens participate in other forms of political 
action (for a review and critique, see Atger 2009). Consequently, theoretical 
expectations surrounding immigrant citizen and non-citizen involvement are 
often inconsistent and contradictory.
The literature alludes to three potential scenarios regarding immigrant 
citizen and non-citizen participation. The first is based on the notion that im-
migrants, especially non-citizen immigrants, are politically impotent or ineffi-
cacious (see Corcoran, Pettinicchio and Young 2011 and Corcoran, Pettinicchio 
and Young 2015 on efficacy and collective action) primarily because they are 
excluded from social and political institutions and, in the case of non-citizens, 
are mostly disenfranchised. Consequently, immigrants’ (and especially non-
citizens’) policy preferences and grievances are of little interest to politicians 
seeking election or re-election. As Munro (2008:6) claimed, “Where non- 
citizen residents lack the right to vote, political candidates lack meaningful 
incentives to be responsive to their concerns.” Under these conditions, im-
migrants (and particularly non-citizens) are expected to have extremely low 
levels of overall political participation relative to natives.
The second scenario (which does not preclude the first) assumes that im-
migrant citizens and non-citizens have different preferences when it comes to 
political participation. Just and Anderson (2012) claimed that the main differ-
ence between citizen and non-citizen immigrants – citizenship status – shapes 
preferences for certain kinds of political action. This claim is based on previous 
work suggesting that due to the precarious or fragile legal and social status of 
non-citizens, they are unlikely to participate in costly, disruptive, or confronta-
tional forms of action (see Varsanyi 2005; Lee 2008). Just and Anderson argued 
that citizenship helps to mitigate this effect by providing immigrants with the 
legal and psychosocial resources necessary for extra-institutional political par-
ticipation (for example, in demonstrations and strikes).
In contrast to this second scenario, a third possibility is that precisely be-
cause of their exclusion from social and political institutions, immigrants 
should in fact be more likely to participate in extra-institutional forms of 
action, including potentially more disruptive and confrontational actions like 
protest demonstrations. Many institutional forms of action, such as contacting 
a politician or signing a petition, which typically impose relatively few costs on 
individuals, rely on the ability to effect change via political institutions. These 
 527Immigrant Political Participation In Europe
comparative sociology 16 (2017) 523-554
types of actions are therefore likely to be considerably less effective for immi-
grants, especially for non-citizens. Simply put, why would individuals who are 
excluded from political institutions (whether informally or statutorily) prefer 
forms of political participation that rely on their institutionality to be effec-
tive? Indeed, this expectation is congruent with existing general theories of 
political participation and social movement mobilization. For instance, a key 
feature of political process theory is that governments that are unreceptive to 
challengers make individual preferences for higher cost forms of action more 
attractive precisely because they occur outside of institutions (on the “gen-
eral political context”, see Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1992; on 
“context of resistance,” see Boudreau 1996; Opp 2009 on micro-level mecha-
nisms in political process theory). Numerous studies have shown that politi-
cal opportunity structures shape immigrant protest behavior (for example, on 
Vietnamese refugees and Portuguese immigrants in Canada and the US, see 
Bloemraad 2006; and on migrants in Britain and Germany, see Koopmans and 
Statham 1999).
In sum, the latter two expectations provide competing frameworks for un-
derstanding native and immigrant/citizen political participation. When immi-
grant citizens and non-citizens do participate, their patterns of participation 
can either point to preferences for so-called extra-institutional action, or to 
participation in more institutional forms that are generally thought to incur 
fewer costs/risks. Taken together, these scenarios present a conundrum which 
may contribute to lower levels of political participation: immigrants (and espe-
cially non-citizen immigrants) should not participate in extra-institutional ac-
tion (especially if these actions are disruptive and confrontational) because 
they are a fragile group, but at the same time, would not find institutional 
forms of action (which are typically lower cost and non-disruptive/non- 
confrontational) available or efficacious because they are either excluded 
from the political process or disenfranchised. Overall, diverse literatures on 
the topic do not always provide clear guidance about what patterns of political 
participation by immigration status should look like. This problem is exacer-
bated by the ways in which forms of political action are conceptualized and 
operationalized.
 Defining Types of Political Action
The range of political action has been conceptualized, defined, and catego-
rized in numerous but related ways. Some think of political participation as 
either normative or non-normative where normative actions are conven-
tional in that they do not put participants in danger of social marginaliza-
tion (Tausch, Becker, Spears, et al. 2011; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 
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2013). Others prefer terms like “conventional” and “non-conventional” (see 
Klandermans 1983). Social movement scholars often define political activism 
in terms of how it challenges institutions, conventions and authority struc-
tures (see Gamson 1975; Bass and Casper 1999; Jost et al. 2011; see also Cress and 
Snow 2000 for a review). Not surprisingly, movement scholars often use terms 
like “confrontational” versus “non-confrontational” and “institutional” versus 
“extra-institutional” participation (Caren, Ghoshal and Ribas 2011).
Given these definitions, signing a petition is usually understood as less costly 
than participating in a strike or demonstration since it does not interfere with 
the “daily routines of ordinary citizens,” whereas disruptive actions, ranging 
from strikes to riots and violent protest, are typically attention-grabbing events 
that defy the social order and everyday routines (Jost et al. 2011, 199). Generally, 
petition signing and voting are considered normative or conventional, while 
protest behaviors are considered non-normative or unconventional. However, 
opinions differ. For example, some scholars have defined legal demonstrations 
as normative since protest demonstrations have become more common in 
democratic societies (see Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Norris 2002; Rucht 2007; see 
also Pettinicchio 2012 and von Zomeren 2013 on “everyday activism”).
Drawing from the political process tradition, social movement scholars view 
the nature of political action as in part shaped by openings and contractions 
in the political opportunity structure as this alters the costs and benefits of 
individual participation (Opp 2009). Extra-institutional activities (like pro-
test demonstrations) are preferred when political opportunities are closed 
and consequently, access to institutional channels is limited (Kitschelt 1986; 
Amenta and Poulsen 1996; Martinez 2008). For this reason, the use of insti-
tutional tactics (including petition signing, see Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak 
and Giugni 1992 on petitions as institutional tactics), are less costly and are 
more effective when states are receptive to challenges. In other words, if gov-
ernments are unsympathetic towards a cause or issue, contacting a politician 
or signing a petition may not be perceived as likely to obtain a desired out-
come, thereby making the use of extra-institutional action relatively more de-
sirable despite its inherent cost.
Thus, regardless of the conceptual scheme used, the underlying assumption 
of most theories of political participation is that involvement in political ac-
tion, especially collective action, is rather rare because of the costs it imposes 
on individuals (von Zomeren 2016; Opp 2009). Even when including one-shot 
activities that can be done privately and with little coordination (such as boy-
cotting, contacting a politician or signing a petition), only about half of the 
pooled sample across ESS waves reported participating in at least one type of 
political action.
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Costs are often understood in terms of the nature of the activity in relation 
to individual characteristics like employment, education, family and social ties 
that shape preferences for certain types of activities (on biographical availabil-
ity and high cost/risk collective action, see McAdam, 1986 and Wiltfang and 
McAdam 1991). Costly activities are often linked to risky ones. Disruptive and 
confrontational forms of participation like protest demonstrations can be both 
costly and risky and therefore, stronger commitment is necessary to overcome 
barriers to participation (Olson 1965; Hechter, Friedman, and Appelbaum 
1982; Caren, Ghoshal and Ribas 2011). For instance, in their recent classifica-
tion of different forms of political action using the World Values Survey (WVS), 
Corcoran et al. (2015) included signing petitions and joining boycotts as low 
cost forms of action because they do not require a lot of time and resources. 
Although they treated strikes and riots as high cost forms of action because 
of the costs and risks they impose, they defined lawful demonstrations as a 
moderate cost form of political action because while they require time and 
resources, they are more normative and thus not as risky as strikes and riots.
However, risk is but one factor shaping costs. Klandermans (2004) defined 
types of political action based on risk and effort on the one hand and time on 
the other, thereby acknowledging that some activities can be high risk/effort 
and short lived like a protest and others can be high effort and of long dura-
tion like volunteering in an organization. But, effort and risk do not always 
coincide. No doubt, short-term participation in a protest or strike may require 
a lot of effort and may be risky. However, other longer term commitments like 
working for a political party or social movement organization may not be risky, 
yet still require more effort than signing a petition or participating in a boycott 
even though all three activities are “institutional.” To complicate matters, activ-
ities like boycotts can be short or long term and can impose various amounts 
of cost depending on alternatives when exiting “the market” (Friedman 1991; 
Hirschman 1970).
Given these characteristics of political action – effort, risk, cost and duration – 
it makes sense that individuals’ preferences for political action are largely 
shaped by their biographical characteristics and availability. We can reason-
ably assume that employed individuals with dependents who have limited 
availability (and may also have limited resources) prefer a low risk, one-shot 
activity like signing a petition than working for a political party or protest-
ing. This is the case regardless of immigrant and citizenship status since it is 
generally the case that all individuals see their actions as means to achieve 
some valued outcome, and weigh this against the costs of participation. This is 
at the heart of value-expectancy theory (see Olson 1965; Klandermans 1984; 
Opp 2009; Corcoran, et al. 2011; Corcoran, et al. 2015).
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Unfortunately, most cross-national studies of political participation using 
surveys like the ESS and the WVS forego details about the nature of politi-
cal participation in favor of sample size at both the individual and country 
levels.1 Nonetheless, measures of political participation used in (but not lim-
ited to) cross-national studies often reflect a range of activities in part meant 
to capture existing conceptual schemes and categorizations. Typically, studies 
using the WVS rely on five items to capture political action: signing a petition, 
participating in a boycott, striking, participating in a legal demonstration, and 
occupying a building. These items have been subsequently employed in other 
datasets (see Klandermans, van Stekelenburg and van der Toorn, 2008). The 
ESS includes a similar but broader set of items. Respondents are not asked 
about strikes or occupying a building. However, they are additionally asked 
about wearing a campaign badge, contacting a politician/elected official, and 
working for a political party or other organization. This broader spectrum of 
items allows us to better compare different types of political action which can 
be mapped onto other related typologies distinguishing, for example, “low 
cost/risk” from “high cost/risk”, “confrontational” from “non-confrontational”, 
or “institutional” from “non-institutional” actions.
The way in which political action is conceptualized, defined and operation-
alized has a direct bearing on immigrant citizen and non-citizen political par-
ticipation. Most studies of immigrant political participation suggest that their 
levels of political involvement are depressed as a consequence of biographical 
unavailability, lack of material and psychological resources, and few organiza-
tional/social ties (see Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet 1989; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995). In addition, their preferences for action are shaped by the extent 
of their exclusion from social and political institutions. Exclusion and disen-
franchisement may decrease overall levels of political participation among im-
migrant groups but it is less clear how these factors shape their preferences for 
different types of political action. Adding to these ambiguities, the numerous 
typologies described in this paper are often conflated or used interchangeably. 
Although these typologies are related and can overlap, their use as such has 
masked more nuanced patterns in political participation among individuals 
and groups.
 Measuring Immigrant Political Participation
Two recent and prominent studies of immigrant political participation in 
Europe, conducted by de Rooij (2012) and Just and Anderson (2012), both ana-
lyzed ESS data. de Rooij claimed that as immigrants become more integrated, 
1   For a review and critique of measuring protest demonstrations, see Biggs (2014).
 531Immigrant Political Participation In Europe
comparative sociology 16 (2017) 523-554
their pattern of participation should increasingly resemble that of natives. She 
found that for immigrants, citizenship is positively associated with increased 
participation in what she referred to as “unconventional” political activities. 
Similarly, Just and Anderson found that immigrant citizens participated in 
more extra-institutional actions than did non-citizens, and at about the same 
levels as natives. Both studies appear to suggest that integration of immigrants 
should see a convergence in their patterns of participation with that of natives, 
especially their participation in extra-institutional forms of political action. 
Accordingly, citizenship and political integration make immigrants and non-
citizen immigrants less wary of participating in political action including more 
public, coordinated and potentially disruptive forms.
While providing useful insights, these recent cross-national studies also 
highlight two related theoretical and empirical problems involved in compar-
ing immigrant and native political participation in different types of action. 
The first relates to how political participation is measured and conceptual-
ized. Both de Rooij and Just and Anderson aggregated individuals’ participa-
tion in each action into additive indices of conventional/unconventional, or 
institutional/un-institutional action respectively. This practice is prevalent 
in the literature on political participation.2 However, a linear additive mea-
sure implies that the jump between each point on the scale (for example, 0-5 
activities) is equally important. Yet, as Just and Anderson acknowledged 
(p. 492), about half of their total ESS sample did not participate in any form of 
political action at all. It seems clear, particularly in the case of high-cost extra-
institutional activities, that moving from “no participation” to “some partici-
pation” is more meaningful than moving from participating in one activity to 
participating in two (or from two to three, etc.).
A second problem arises from the way in which both de Rooij and Just and 
Anderson draw from previous work (see Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2002) 
to categorize political activities. de Rooij classified voting, wearing a campaign 
badge, working for a political party or action group, working in another type 
of organization, or contacting an elected representative as conventional ac-
tions, and taking part in a boycott, signing a petition, or taking part in a lawful 
demonstration as unconventional actions. Just and Anderson used an alterna-
tive typology (institutional vs. un-institutional), but similarly classified con-
tacting a politician, working in a political party or other organization, wearing 
2   Aggregating items into one measure (either as a binary to capture overall participation or a 
count to get at the extent of participation) is quite common and the items together are often 
treated as a measure of collective action and/or protest involvement (see Klandermans 1997; 
Klandermans et al. 2008; van Zomeren and Iyer 2009; Biggs 2014).
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a campaign badge, and donating money to a political party together as insti-
tutional actions; separately from signing a petition, taking part in a boycott, 
participating in legal or illegal protests, and buying products for ethical, envi-
ronmental, or political reasons (un-institutional actions).
Categories like extra-institutional, unconventional, confrontational and dis-
ruptive may be prima facie valid because it is assumed that they include higher 
cost/risk forms of political participation. Indeed, as we noted, the notion of 
costs and risks undergirds most of these categorizations where terms like un-
conventional and extra-institutional are often used interchangeably. However, 
as we and others have also pointed out, it is not always the case that extra- 
institutional tactics are more costly or require more effort than institutional 
ones (for example participating once in a legal demonstration versus long-
term volunteering in a social movement group) or that petitions and boycotts 
require the same effort and involvement and impose the same risk as a strike 
or protest. If the assumption is that unconventional or un-institutional activi-
ties are inherently costlier/riskier, treating petitions and boycotts as unconven-
tional or un-institutional therefore seems problematic. In addition, given the 
lack of information about the duration, targets, goals and motivations under-
lying political participation from the items included in cross-national survey 
data, it is difficult to determine the extent of unconventionality, disruption and 
cost associated with different types of actions justifying a dichotomous con-
ventional/unconventional categorization. This problem is especially salient 
when applying theories of political participation specifically to immigrants.
Just and Anderson hypothesized that citizen immigrants should have the ma-
terial, legal, and psychological resources required to engage in un-institutional 
types of action, explicitly referring to un-institutional actions as costly. However, 
they categorized petition signing, which is one of the lowest cost, most com-
mon forms of political participation (see Caren et al. 2011; Dalton et al. 2009; 
Corcoran et al. 2011), as un-institutional, alongside less frequent and potentially 
more costly/risky and disruptive forms of participation like demonstrations.3 
This clearly illustrates the problem of conflating institutionality with costs and 
risks. de Rooij acknowledged the problem explicitly noting that petition sign-
ing, while considered “unconventional,” is still low-cost. Nevertheless, like Just 
and Anderson, de Rooij’s dependent variable situated petition signing among 
other higher cost forms of action like protest demonstrations.
3   For example, according to the WVS, roughly twice as many people have ever signed a petition 
than have ever participated in a legal demonstration, three times as many have signed a peti-
tion than have joined a boycott, and more than six times as many have signed a petition than 
have occupied a building or participated in a strike.
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No doubt, petitions have been an important part of social movement tac-
tical repertoires (see Earl and Kimport 2011; Kriesi 1989). But, as Dalton and 
colleagues explained in a footnote (Dalton et al. 2009: 62), petition signing “is 
a basic democratic right and part of conventional democratic politics,” and is 
arguably neither unconventional nor extra-institutional. Indeed, petition sign-
ing has been treated similarly to activities like donating money (which Just 
and Anderson consider institutional) and as a one-shot, low cost, low risk form 
of participation requiring minimal effort (see McAdam 1986; Taylor and Van 
Dyke 2004). Kriesi’s study of the Dutch Peace Movement found that many 
more individuals signed a petition than participated in the movement, and 
that for many, signing a petition reflected “their limit of involvement” relative 
to more “active” forms of participation (Kriesi 1989: 1096). He went on to say 
(p. 1098) that:
Strangely enough, many more people say they have signed the petition 
than indicate they have participated in the movement, and there are 
even somewhat more people who say they have signed the petition than 
people who are ready to participate in the movement. Apparently, sign-
ing the petition was not always perceived as a form of participation in a 
peace movement activity, at least not by a majority of those who signed.
Yet, this is not so strange from the point of view of Olson’s theory because 
“Forms of collective action that impose few personal costs on individual par-
ticipants will take place more frequently than those that impose greater costs. 
This helps explain why ethnic voting and lobbying (which impose few costs) 
are so much more common than ethnically based guerilla wars” (Hechter et al. 
1982:420). Including petition signing alongside activities like protest demon-
strations may therefore give us a misleading picture of who is participating in 
higher-cost, more unconventional types of political action.
As Table 1 shows, both Just and Anderson and de Rooij reported higher 
levels of participation in unconventional/un-institutional types of action, with 
de Rooij reporting an approximate 2:1 ratio of participation in unconventional 
versus conventional actions. This runs against general theories of participation 
which claim that higher cost forms of participation are much less frequent 
than lower cost forms. We argue that treating petition signing as un-institu-
tional/unconventional is likely to be driving these unexpected results. Note 
that when we re-categorized petition signing as institutional (the rows headed 
“Re-categorized” in Table 1; all other activities were classified as in Just and 
Anderson), not only are levels of participation reversed as indicated by the 




















































































Extra-Institutional 36.37 37.82 32.32 n/a n/a
Note: Numbers in the headed columns are the percentage of each group who report having participated in each type of action. Numbers in the delta columns 
are the percentage point difference in participation rates between the two forms of action.
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and extra-institutional participation across groups are also substantially dif-
ferent (especially for non-citizen immigrants). Although they still participated 
less overall than natives and citizen immigrants, when we re-categorized po-
litical action, non-citizens are the only group to report higher levels of extra- 
institutional participation relative to institutional participation. However, 
after re-categorizing participation, the gap between non-citizen participation 
in institutional and extra-institutional action becomes much smaller than 
what prior studies reported. This shows that small changes to how activities 
are classified can have significant effects on the results.
Table 1 highlights a related problem, which is the lack of attention paid to 
differences between groups in terms of their patterns of participation across 
activity type, where dichotomizing political participation masks these group 
differences. Disaggregating these categories of action and examining relative 
rates of participation across each activity gives us a more complete picture of 
how groups differ in their political participation preferences. Immigrants have 
lower overall levels of participation but may also have different preferences for 
certain types of action. Their preferences may be shaped by their lack of social 
and political resources as well as their legal status, which has been assumed 
would lead to a stronger preference for low-cost, low-risk types of action like 
petition signing. On the other hand, immigrants and particularly non-citizens 
as a result of their exclusion may to a greater extent than natives, prefer not 
to sign petitions – since they have little ability to formally sanction elected of-
ficials.4 They may instead prefer boycotts (see Pulido 2007) and strikes or dem-
onstrations (see Martiniello 2005).
In the analyses reported below, we investigate these questions by examin-
ing the detailed political participation patterns of natives, immigrant citizens, 
and non-citizens – without pre-imposing a particular classification of activ-
ity types. In our analyses, we also account for a large number of covariates 
thought to explain differences in participation between these groups.
4   See Kriesi et al. 1992 and Parry, Smith and Henry 2011. While Harris and Gillion (2010) referred 
to all activities outside the electoral process as unconventional and extra-institutional 
(including signing petitions), they simultaneously alluded to the fact that petition signing 
can be considered an institutional tactic given that often, voters sign petitions because they 
are backed by an ability to reprimand elected officials if they do not address their grievances.
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 Data and Methods
For our primary analyses, we used pooled data from the first six waves of the 
European Social Survey. The ESS is a cross-national survey which has been con-
ducted biennially since 2002. Within each country, random probability sam-
pling is used to obtain a representative sample of non-institutional residents 
aged 15 and above, with a target minimum response rate of 70%.
The ESS is appropriate for testing differential political participation among 
immigrant citizens and non-citizens as it includes substantial numbers of 
these individuals across countries. Their proportions in the ESS sample ap-
pear to reflect actual proportions of immigrant citizens and non-citizens, as 
reported in official statistics such as Eurostat (Just and Anderson 2012:491). In 
addition to numerous biographical characteristics, the survey contains ques-
tions about immigrants’ time in the host country and whether the individual 
speaks the national language at home. As noted above, the ESS also includes 
questions on a broad range of political activities.
In our primary analyses, we included data from 13 countries which were 
present in all six waves of the ESS: Belgium (N=10,808), Denmark (N=9,334), 
Finland (N=12,188), France (N=11,064), Germany (N=17,445), the Republic of 
Ireland (N=13,100), the Netherlands (N=11,586), Norway (N=10,267), Portugal 
(N=12,453), Spain (N=11,618), Sweden (N=11,048), Switzerland (N=10,803), and 
the U.K. (13,403). Following Just and Anderson, we excluded Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia from our analysis because their national samples included no, or 
very few, non-citizen immigrants.
Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent analyses are based on a sample 
of respondents with complete data on all relevant variables (N=142,169). There 
was less than 1% missing values for all variables except religion (5% missing 
values).
 Dependent Variables
The six waves of the ESS included the following question about respondents’ 
political participation:
There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country of 
residence] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 
12 months, have you done any of the following:
• Contacted a politician, government or local government official?
• Worked in a political party or action group?
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• Worked in another organization or association?
• Worn or displayed a campaign badge or sticker?
• Signed a petition?
• Taken part in a lawful public demonstration?
• Boycotted certain products?
In order to compare participation across each activity, we coded responses 
to each as binary indicators for the purposes of analysis rather than group-
ing activities based on a priori assumptions about their institutionality or 
costliness.
 Independent Variables
Our key independent variable, immigration status (Native, Citizen immigrant, 
or Non-citizen immigrant), was derived from two ESS items asking whether 
the respondent was born in their current country of residence, and whether 
they are a citizen of their current country (see Appendix A1 for population 
shares in each country).5
To account for potential demographic and socio-economic explanations for 
group differences in political participation, we also included a number of mea-
sures of biographical and socio-economic characteristics:
• Gender (dichotomous variable, 1=male; 0=female)
• Age (in continuous years)
• Religious affiliation (Christian, Muslim, Other, or No religion)
• Single status (1=not married or co-resident with a partner; 0=otherwise)
• Children at home (1=yes; 0=no)
• Dependent partner (1=respondent’s partner currently unemployed, unable 
to work due to a health problem, looking after the home or family, or in full-
time education; 0=otherwise)
• Currently in full-time education (1=yes; 0=no)
• Currently unemployed (1=unemployed and looking for work, or due to long-
term illness, 0=otherwise)
• Ever unemployed for more than three months (1=yes, 0=no)
• Educational attainment (measured as the number of years in full-time 
education)
5   We excluded 709 respondents who reported being born in their current country of residence, 
but not being citizens.
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• Lives in an urban area (1=respondent lives in a big city, or suburbs or out-
skirts of a big city – see de Rooij; 0=otherwise)
• Speaks the national language at home as a first or second language (1=no, 
0=yes)6
These biographical characteristics have previously been linked to overall 
political participation, although it is less clear theoretically and empirically 
how they might shape differential participation in specific types of action. 
McAdam (1986) and Wiltfang and McAdam (1991) showed that personal con-
straints make higher cost forms of participation, which typically require more 
commitment, less preferred. Employment and family commitments may 
therefore act as countervailing forces especially in extra-institutional forms of 
action. For similar reasons, it may not be surprising that younger people (espe-
cially students) are more likely to participate in high-cost, extra-institutional 
types of political action because they have fewer countervailing ties or “rigid 
commitments” (Schussman and Soule 2005). Employment has been thought to 
limit participation in extra-institutional activities because individuals who are 
employed are less likely to risk their jobs (McCarthy and Zald 1973) but again, 
findings are mixed (see Schussman and Soule 2005). Similarly, while schol-
ars have shown that material and psychological resources provided through 
education and income increase participation in both institutional and extra- 
institutional forms of action (see Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; McVeigh 
and Smith 1999; Dalton 2002), the literature is less clear about how or why 
resources might shape differential participation in institutional and extra-
institutional forms. And, there is some ambiguity about whether we should 
expect biographical availability and resources to shape immigrant participa-
tion differently than for natives (Hardy-Fanta 1993; Leighley 2001). Yet, it is 
likely that citizen and non-citizen immigrants’ position in the social and politi-
cal structure shapes their biographical availability and resources, which in turn 
affect their political participation (Martinez 2005; Okamoto and Ebert 2010).7
6   Multiple possible national languages were accounted for in Belgium (Dutch and French), 
Switzerland (German, French, Italian, Romansh), Spain (Spanish and Catalan), the U.K. 
(English and Welsh), Ireland (English and Gaelic), and the Netherlands (Dutch and Frisian).
7   Immigrant citizens are generally demographically closer to non-citizens than they are to 
natives. Both immigrant groups are more likely to have children at home, to have a depen-
dent partner, to be unemployed or to have been unemployed previously, to live in an urban 
area and not to speak the national language at home. As noted, these biographical factors 
may facilitate or inhibit immigrant groups from participating in certain kinds of political 
action (see Appendix Table A2).
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 Analyses and Results
Before examining the detailed patterns of participation based on the effects of 
covariates,8 we first estimated the percentage of each group who participated 
in any type of political action (any of the activities listed above). As expected, 
without accounting for any biographical differences, we found that both 
immigrant groups were substantially less likely to participate. 53.2% of natives 
reported having participated in at least one type of political action in the last 
12 months, compared to 46.2% of immigrant citizens and 35.9% of immigrant 
non-citizens.
This overall distance is also clear from Figure 1, where we break down par-
ticipation rates by specific activity. This figure shows that immigrants, and 
particularly non-citizens, tend to participate less across the board. Overall, the 
rates of participation by group across activities suggest that immigrant politi-
cal participation in general does not follow a unique pattern compared to that 
of natives. Regardless of immigration status, people are most likely to engage 
in petition signing and boycotts – both of which can be considered low cost/
risk forms of action. That is, people are more willing to not buy something, or 
to sign something. It may be that these types of actions are more appealing 
to all groups because individuals can engage in both types of activities only 
once, seeking to influence outcomes privately without necessarily requiring 
8   These and all subsequently reported figures are weighted by both the population and design 
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Figure 1 Political participation by immigration status.
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significant efforts in coordinating directly with others.9 Consistent with this, 
the activity that people (of all statuses) are least likely to engage in is working 
for a political party or political action group – an activity which may require 
significant effort and time investment, but which is not typically treated as 
extra-institutional or unconventional.
Comparing citizen and non-citizen immigrants, Figure 1 also shows that 
non-citizen immigrants are less likely to participate in protest demonstra-
tions than immigrant citizens (immigrant citizens and natives seem to have 
roughly the same rate of participation in a demonstration). In fact, non- 
citizens participate in demonstrations at about the same rate as contacting a 
politician and wearing a campaign badge (immigrant citizens and natives also 
have similar rates when it comes to wearing a campaign badge). The patterns 
described in Figure 1 illustrate how grouping activities into institutional/un-
institutional produces misleading portraits of participation. These patterns do 
not point to any obvious distinctions in immigrant citizen, non-citizen and 
native participation based on this dichotomy. What both Table 1 and Figure 1 
suggest is that what likely drives the rates for non-citizen participation in 
extra-institutional activities is including petitions and boycotts in that group-
ing. We argue both activities (but especially the former) are dubious examples 
of unconventionality.
 Accounting for Biographical Factors
Figure 2 shows predicted rates of participation in each type of activity after 
accounting for all of the covariates described above. These were derived from 
logistic regression models with fixed effects for country and ESS wave. These 
results show a very similar pattern to the unadjusted patterns described above. 
After accounting for biographical differences, non-citizen immigrants remain 
less likely than both natives and immigrant citizens to participate across the 
board, where the distances between citizens and non-citizens is particularly 
pronounced for petition signing and boycotts (although these are still the two 
activities in which non-citizens participate most relative to other activities). 
Non-citizen immigrants remain less likely than natives to participate in con-
tacting politicians, working for other organizations, petition signing, and boy-
cotts. In sum, all three groups participate least in working for a political party, 
wearing a badge and taking part in a demonstration, and most in petition 
9   Debates about whether boycotts and petitions are forms of collective action and their effi-
cacy in influencing outcomes have surfaced in recent popular debates about “slacktivism” 
particularly in terms of online petition signing and consumer boycotts.
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signing and boycotts. The data underlying Figure 2 (including confidence 
intervals) is provided in Table 2.
To explore these results further, Figure 3 plots the relative odds that im-
migrant citizens (versus natives) and non-citizens (versus natives) will par-
ticipate in each form of political action (again, adjusting for covariates).10 
Non-citizen immigrants are significantly less likely to work for a political party 
than both citizen immigrants and natives (see also Table 2) which may in part 
be explained by how disenfranchisement discourages long-term commitment 
to more highly “institutionalized” forms of political involvement. Non-citizen 
immigrants are also less likely than citizen immigrants to do other organiza-
tional work, wear a campaign badge, and sign a petition (all of which have 
been associated with the regular political and electoral process). The activity 
for which non-citizen participation most closely resembles that of immigrant 
citizens (and therefore natives) is joining a boycott (see Figure 3 and Table 2). 
This might be because boycotts require less coordination and can be done pri-
vately. It may also be the case that boycotts (especially consumer boycotts) 
are an indirect way to influence political outcomes and thus do not hinge on 
political inclusion, citizenship and voting rights.
10   We also ran these analyses with the subset of participators only (that is, excluding those 
who never participated in any form of action) to account for possible qualitative differ-
ences between those who participated in some type of political action and those who 
never participated in any form of action (see Schussman and Soule 2005; Saunders, 
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Figure 3 Relative odds of participation by immigration status (adjusted).
Table 2 Adjusted estimates and confidence intervals (in parentheses) by type of political 
participation and immigrant status
Natives Immigrant citizens Immigrant non-citizens
Contacted pol 14.8 (14.53 , 15.09) 11.1 (10.10 , 12.18) 9.3 (8.16 , 10.47)
Party or PAG work 4.1 (3.92 , 4.23) 4.1 (3.45 , 4.85) 1.7 (1.25 , 2.16)
Other org work 17.9 (17.65 , 18.23) 14.1 (12.87 , 15.24) 11.2 (9.95 , 12.51)
Badge 8 (7.80 , 8.23) 8.3 (7.34 , 9.23) 4.9 (4.05 , 5.66)
Petition 31 (30.64 , 31.37) 24.6 (23.18 , 26.08) 16.8 (15.34 , 18.29)
Boycott 22.7 (22.34 , 23.00) 18.7 (17.41 , 20.00) 16.8 (15.22 , 18.31)
Demo 10.4 (10.12 , 10.62) 10.5 (9.41 , 11.56) 5.7 (4.87 , 6.61)
Any participation 53.4 (53.06 , 53.84) 45 (43.20 , 46.54) 36.6 (34.63 , 38.51)
The relative odds displayed in Figure 3 suggest that compared to natives, immi-
grant citizens are less likely to participate in boycotts, petition signing, other 
organizational work, and contacting a politician by roughly the same margin. 
Formal comparisons of these coefficients (using Wald tests, see Appendix 
Table A3) show that, indeed, these odds ratios are not significantly different 
from each other. Note that the first two activities have previously been treated 
as “un-institutional” or “unconventional” while the latter two have not. Given 
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that immigrant citizens’ reduced likelihood to participate in these activities 
are about equal, it raises additional concerns about the a priori assignment of 
these types of action into categories as this masks other potential qualitative 
similarities between these types of action (i.e., level of commitment, duration, 
and availability of the tactic).
This concern is even more pronounced when comparing effect sizes for 
different types of participation between non-citizens and natives. Inspection 
of Figure 3 suggests that non-citizens’ lower participation rates relative to na-
tives are substantially more marked for some activities than others. Figure 3 
points to two main groups of political activity based on the size of the odds of 
participation. For the first group – comprising boycotts, badge wearing, other 
organizational work, and contacting a politician – non-citizen immigrants are 
somewhat less likely than natives (and immigrant citizens) to participate. For 
the second group – comprising petition signing and working for political party 
or action group – the difference from natives is more pronounced. Wald tests 
confirm that the odds ratios within these groups are not significantly differ-
ent from each other and that the odds ratios for activities in the first group 
are all significantly different from the odds ratios for activities in the second 
group (see Appendix Table A3). Importantly, demonstrations do not appear to 
be neatly situated in either group of activities. Wald tests show that the effect 
of non-citizen immigrant status on participating in demonstrations is not sta-
tistically distinguishable from its effect on any of the other activities, with the 
exception of participating in a boycott.
Interestingly, when it comes to petition signing, the effect size for non-citi-
zens compared to natives is not statistically different than for demonstrations 
or working for a political party, but is significantly different from boycotts, 
badge wearing, other org work, and contacting politicians. This again high-
lights the problems associated with categorizing these activities based on insti-
tutionality or conventionality. Also notable is the contrast in the way activities 
cluster (in terms of relative differences in the size of the odds of participa-
tion compared to natives) by immigrant status. For citizen immigrants, dem-
onstrations, badge wearing, and working for a political party or action group 
are activities in which they are just as likely to participate as natives. Boycotts, 
petition signing, other organizational work and contacting a politician, on the 
other hand, are activities in which immigrant citizens are less likely to partici-
pate than natives. For non-citizen immigrants though, petition signing cannot 
be grouped together with boycotts or other organizational work, and working 
for a political party cannot be grouped with badge wearing based on the size of 
the odds of their participation across these types of political action.
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We summarize our findings as follows. First, immigrants participate less 
than natives overall. Second, we find that individuals, regardless of status, ap-
pear to prefer activities that require less commitment and coordination (such 
as petitions and boycotts). All three groups participate least in working for a 
party, wearing a badge and demonstrations. Third, breaking down political 
participation into specific types of activity sheds light on preferences. Notably, 
non-citizen immigrants are less likely than citizen immigrants to participate 
in activities associated with the regular political/electoral process but are very 
similar in their participation in boycotts. Finally, comparing differences in the 
size of the effects by group across type of activity provides additional insight 
on patterns and preferences for political participation. For example, immi-
grant citizens participate less than natives in boycotts, petition-signing, orga-
nizational work and contacting a politician by the same magnitude. Whereas 
for non-citizen immigrants, boycotts and petition signing cannot be grouped 
together.
Our findings suggest that patterns of participation do not neatly coincide 
with the cost/risk and institutionality conceptualization of political activity. 
For instance, non-citizen immigrants and citizen immigrants tend to be similar 
in their preferences for contacting a politician – an institutional form of action 
that requires some political inclusion (such as the franchise), which non- 
citizens are less likely to have, in order to be effective.11 However immigrant cit-
izens and non-citizens are significantly different when it comes to working for 
a party and wearing a campaign badge. Similarly, effect sizes for some activities 
typically treated as unconventional and others treated as conventional are not 
statistically different. These findings point to multiple dimensions shaping im-
migrant citizen and non-citizen preferences for political action. These include 
risk, commitment, duration and expectations for obtaining a desired outcome, 
which can in fact be shared by activities that are traditionally treated as dis-
tinct. Demonstrations and working for a political party may require similar 
levels of commitment over a period of time, while signing petitions and con-
tacting a politician may require less commitment and can be of very limited 
duration.
11   Given that recent studies on immigrant participation (like de Rooij 2012) used only the 
first wave of the ESS to conduct their analyses (the first wave contained a more complete 
list of political activities than other ESS waves), we also re-ran our analyses using the first 
wave only. Our findings were quite similar to those based on all six ESS waves. Overall, 
immigrants are quite similar to natives in their preferences for types of political action, 
including protest demonstrations, while non-citizen immigrants again appear slightly 
more averse to working for a party or signing petitions.
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 Discussion and Conclusion
The recent literature on immigrant political participation has pointed to 
important mechanisms linking a variety of factors like biographical avail-
ability, social embeddedness and citizenship to political action. This growing 
body of work raises a key debate about whether “unique patterns” or mecha-
nisms explain immigrant political participation (Leighley 2001; Klandermans, 
et al. 2008; de Rooij 2012). Existing theories of political participation and col-
lective action suggest that the same considerations, processes and mecha-
nisms apply to immigrant participation. Scholars noted that “There is nothing 
to distinguish the causes of ethnic collective action from the causes of any 
other kind” (Hechter, et al. 1982, 413) and that “… immigrant citizenship and 
political incorporation is a process akin to social movement mobilization, 
involving friends, family, ethnic organizations and local community leaders” 
(Bloemraad 2006, 668).
Some of our findings are consistent with certain theoretical and empirical 
expectations about immigrant and native participation. However, by unpack-
ing forms of action and focusing on differences between groups in their partic-
ipation patterns, our analyses raise conceptual and empirical questions about 
preferences for action. We claim that our results do not provide particularly 
compelling evidence that citizenship, by providing immigrants with neces-
sary legal and psychosocial resources, acts as “a ticket” specifically to so-called 
extra-institutional participation. However, citizenship may act to bring immi-
grants into the political process of a given country by making available to them 
the extant variety of tactical repertoires. Immigrant citizens and non-citizens 
are most similar in their rates of participation in boycotts. They are most dif-
ferent in their rates of participation in petition-signing (although this is still 
the most preferred type of action for both groups), badge wearing, demonstra-
tions, and working for a political party. Thus, citizenship may be a ticket to 
participation in everyday politics including a range of action that has been pre-
viously categorized as both institutional and un-institutional. Distinguishing 
between relative and absolute participation suggests that immigrant political 
action can be understood via existing theoretical frameworks pointing to how 
biographical as well as political and social movement contexts, mobilize actors 
into different forms of action.
We also highlighted certain problems associated with measuring and com-
paring political participation among immigrants and natives. The ways in 
which activities are traditionally grouped run the risk of conflating factors like 
cost, risk, effort and commitment that can shape why some individuals par-
ticipate in some activities while others do not at all. These broad categories 
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group qualitatively different activities that vary widely in terms of the costs 
they impose and the effort they require to engage in them. And, this has im-
portant consequences on the conclusions we make about political participa-
tion. Categorizing petition signing alongside protest demonstrations as an 
extra-institutional activity can lead to dramatic overestimations in the overall 
amount of participation in what are treated as higher cost, unconventional ac-
tivities, while simultaneously downplaying immigrant citizen and non-citizen 
preferences for activities associated with the everyday electoral or democratic 
process.
Our findings point to the importance of isolating more proximate variables 
explaining differences in participation rather than blending costs, risks and 
institutionality. Some political activities included in our analysis can be “one-
shot” (such as petition-signing), thus requiring relatively short-term involve-
ment and/or commitment (See McAdam 1986; Taylor and van Dyke 2004). 
Other institutional or conventional activities like working for a party or move-
ment group require longer-term commitments. Additionally, individuals may 
participate in an extra-institutional form of action like a legal or illegal protest 
demonstration, which may require as much effort and commitment as work-
ing for a party if the protest event and the individual’s participation endures. 
But, an individual may briefly participate once in a protest event which may 
require as much commitment as signing a petition or contacting a politician.
Of course, large cross-national surveys rarely ask about the motivations 
or pretenses surrounding participation, making it difficult to assess how com-
mitted a participant is or whether one-time events or actions may be preferred 
by some groups over others. Unfortunately, as is the case with the majority 
of survey datasets employed in this literature, the ESS does not examine re-
spondents’ motivations for engaging in political action. We are only able to 
determine that, for example, a given respondent has engaged in a protest dem-
onstration, or has joined a political action group. We are unable to determine 
what specifically motivated an individual to act or what the activity specifi-
cally entailed. To take an extreme case, two respondents engaging in the same 
form of political action, could be on opposite sides of an issue, mobilized by 
different structures, where participation for one individual was recurring, and 
for the other a one-time event. Yet, they would look identical in the ESS data. 
This severely limits our ability to examine the role of differing grievances and 
mobilizing efforts contributing to immigrants’ preferences for different types 
of political action.
Our findings indicate that by and large, immigrant preferences are stronger 
for one-shot activities that may be coordinated (although not necessarily) but 
acted on privately over activities that are more public requiring organization, 
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more extensive coordination and longer term commitments. In addition to 
biographical availability, this may be because their fragile status makes non-
citizens wary about public displays of dissatisfaction or about identifying with 
certain causes. It may also be the case that the political issues motivating immi-
grants and non-citizen immigrants are lower profile, lacking a prominent place 
in a political campaign and/or policy agenda. These issues may not generate 
the kind of collective action and public interest other issues might. This can 
shape preferences for certain tactics like contacting a politician or boycotting 
products which may not require a lot of coordination, can be done privately, 
and can be highly directed at issues at the local, national, and international 
levels (such as boycotting products associated with a political regime). Indeed, 
boycotts are adaptable to the availability of individual and group resources. 
Organized recruitment and mobilization of immigrant communities by po-
litical campaigns, movement groups, church organizations and labor unions 
may also increase immigrants’ preferences and likelihood for participation in 
certain kinds of activities within political, institutional and cultural contexts 
specific to the countries within which political participation takes place.
Scholars of political institutions and political participation have point-
ed to national governing and class structures in shaping opportunities for 
when, how and why political action takes place (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 
1992; Kriesi 1996; Rucht 1996; Lijphart 1999). In their cross-national study of 
political participation, Corcoran, Pettinicchio and Young (2011) found that 
country-level political-institutional factors like electoral self-determination, 
democratic consolidation and women’s political representation shape individ-
ual preferences for different forms of action. A basic comparative analysis of 
our country-level data shows that there is substantial cross-national variation 
in the differences between non-citizen immigrants, immigrants and natives 
in their political participation. Controlling for all individual-level covariates, 
the participation rates of immigrants in most activities, relative to natives, are 
generally most depressed in Germany, Finland and Spain. Notably, there are 
also some countries where immigrant citizens are more likely than natives to 
participate in certain political activities. For example, in France and Portugal, 
immigrant citizens are significantly more likely than natives to have done work 
for a political party or action group; in Ireland they are significantly more likely 
than natives to sign petitions; and in Ireland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, 
they are significantly more likely to participate in public demonstrations.
Thus, national contexts are likely to matter in explaining immigrant and 
non-citizen immigrant participation. Political marginalization and exclu-
sion as well as anti-immigrant political rhetoric can mobilize immigrants into 
more disruptive forms of action. In addition, it may be the case that grievances 
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unique to immigrants, combined with exclusion from conventional political 
channels, shape their preferences for some types of actions over others. Strong 
state responses on the issue of integration have produced remarkable episodes 
of mass participation in collective action by both immigrant citizens and non-
citizens. Many immigrant groups in Europe, for example immigrants from 
predominantly Muslim countries, suffer both high levels of discrimination 
and political and social exclusion within their “host” countries (Klandermans 
et al. 2008). It may be the case that Muslim immigrants and non-citizen immi-
grants in some countries show increasing preferences for more costly, disrup-
tive forms of political action. A full formal and systematic analysis of national 
differences is beyond the scope of this study. However, future research should 
explore how national political and social institutions shape individual-level 
preferences across groups for different types of political action.
As it becomes increasingly clear that immigrants and non-citizen immi-
grants participate in a variety of political action, future comparative work 
should shed light on the processes involved in shaping preferences for certain 
types of action. This will likely involve the use of alternative cross-national 
data sources more suited to a close examination of the motivations behind 
immigrant political action. Immigrants “will constitute some of the major 
protest movements of the future in many Western countries” (Klandermans, 
et al. 2008, 1009). This makes it particularly important to understand how and 
why immigrants and non-citizens become more committed to participation 
in potentially confrontational and disruptive forms of action, as well as why 
they do not.
To do this, scholars should further investigate whether and how biographi-
cal and institutional factors differentially shape patterns of participation in 
different forms of action across groups. When it comes to immigrant political 
participation, individual-level factors like education, income and social ties, 
which are thought to provide material and psychological resources necessary 
for participation, are inherently a product of immigrants’ position vis-à-vis 
social and political structures. The extent of their exclusion shapes the kinds 
of resources at their disposal. Not surprisingly, scholars interested in explain-
ing immigrant political participation and mobilization have thought of citi-
zenship as a means to gain access to institutions and resources which in turn 
shape political preferences and behaviors (See Ebert and Okamota 2013 for 
recent work on citizenship and political inclusion). The literature is less clear 
about whether increasing access to social and political institutions increases 
or decreases participation in short or long term, public or private, high or low 
cost and confrontational or non-confrontational political action. In order to 
address this and the other theoretical ambiguities mentioned in our paper, it is 
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important that future cross-national work investigates the link between access 
to political and social institutions and immigrants’ perceptions of the efficacy 
of different forms of action relative to their expectations about the outcomes 
of their political participation.
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 Appendix
Table A1 Percent natives, citizen and non-citizen immigrants across  
13 European countries
Natives Citizen immigrants Non-citizen immigrants
BE 89.87 5.38 4.75
CH 79.63 8.57 11.8
DE 90.03 6.11 3.85
DK 94.04 3.46 2.5
ES 91.51 2.53 5.96
FI 96.92 1.71 1.37
FR 90.57 5.79 3.63
GB 88.88 7.28 3.84
IE 87.84 5.11 7.04
NL 91.9 6.07 2.03
NO 91.5 4.03 4.47
PT 94.12 3.31 2.57
SE 88.82 8.25 2.93
Table A2 Descriptive statistics










% male 48.09 48.35 47.47
% single 36.9 33.19 33.22
% with children at home 37.66 47.81 47.3
% with dependent partner 15.08 18.51 19.56
% in full-time education 9.12 7.46 9.46
% currently unemployed 5.79 8.49 12.35
% ever been long-term unemployed 26.69 33.22 36.48






% living in urban area 28.89 41.87 43.61
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% not speaking national language at 
home
34.37 45.32 51.18
% Christian 50.59 43.51 41.88
% Muslim 0.97 13.65 20.99
% Other religion 0.63 4.84 3.82
% No religion 47.81 38 33.32
N 140,495 7,929 6,584
Table A3 Pairwise comparison of coefficients for citizen and non-citizen immigrant  
participation relative to natives
Demon-
stration







Demonstration – *** *** nd *** nd ***
Boycott – nd *** nd ** nd
Petition – *** nd *** nd
Badge – *** nd ***
Other org work – ** nd
Party or PAG work – ***
Contacted pol –
Non-citizen immigrants
Demonstration – ** nd nd nd nd nd
Boycott – *** nd nd *** nd
Petition – ** ** nd ***
Badge – nd * nd
Other org work – * nd
Party or PAG work – *
Contacted pol –
Note: Results from Wald tests comparing coefficients for the effect of immigration status on each 
activity: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, nd = coefficients are not significantly different; Natives 
are comparison group.
Table A2 Descriptive statistics (cont.)
